This research develops a simple theory to analyze the compatibility of depopulation and sustainable growth. By introducing the scale effect of aggregate rather than average human capital, it shows that the economy may enter a sustainable growth path with fertility recovery, keeping away from a non-Malthusian poverty trap.
Introduction
Over the last few decades, there has been a strand of theoretical literature studying the role of population in economic growth. One of its main arguments is that population expansion improves total factor productivity through various channels, including the increase in potential inventors (Kremer [1] ) and R&D activities (Romer [2] , Aghion and Howitt [3] ). The size of population is proposed as a key determinant for the level of output per worker, although its effect on the growth rate may vanish in the long run. 1 Such theories typically build on the condition that population increases in size over time. Certainly, they can incorporate population aging as long as fertility rates are above replacement level. 2 However, this restriction will not be appropriate for some advanced economies in the future. According to the United Nations ( [6] , p. 11), the world between 2005 and 2010 has as many as 75 countries or areas whose total fertility levels are below replacement level. Germany, Italy, and Japan will enter the phase of population decline over the decades up to 2050 (ibid., pp. 61-62). Because depopulation would exert adverse effects on the growth process, it is not theoretically apparent whether these economies will sustain growth in the long run. Existing studies are unsatisfactory in this respect. Although the possibility of sustainable growth against depopulation is demonstrated by Dalgaard and Kreiner [7] and Strulik [8] , they treat demographic factors exogenously and thus are silent about the potential interaction between the fertility decision and the living standard. Taking this approach neglects the feedback effect of economic growth on population and fails to examine the possibility of population recovery. 3 Equally important, it is questionable whether their result-steady growth in output per worker accompanied by permanent depopulation-should be interpreted as economic growth. These issues are not addressed even in a seminal work by Strulik et al. [10] , which would be the most relevant to the present paper. They aim to account for the past and future dynamics of an economy in which fertility decisions and private R&D activities are endogenous. Although the fertility rate they calibrate exhibits an upward recovery to replacement level, it is generated by an exogenous parameter change in the development process. Furthermore, they omit the possibility of stagnation resulting from depopulation by taking the entrance to a persistent growth path as historically independent. The present paper, in contrast, conducts a global dynamic analysis to present the existence of a nonMalthusian, catastrophic poverty trap, toward which population keeps shrinking and productivity goes into a stall.
Motivated by these observations, this research offers a theoretical framework for analyzing the compatibility of economic growth with depopulation. It develops a simple and tractable dynamic model of an economy that exhibits the following features. 4 First, households face a quantity-quality trade-off in child rearing. Fertility decline results from a rise in education investment or, alternatively, from a decline in parental income. Second, the amount of new technology is assumed to depend on the level of aggregate rather than average human capital. This formulation, along with the quantity-quality trade-off, implies that education investment does not necessarily accelerate technological progress. Third, a rise in the technology level in turn augments skills by providing new knowledge/ideas to the young generation. 5 Under such circumstances, average human capital increases over time and thus aggregate human capital exhibits faster growth than working population. Consequently the initially depopulating economy may sustain growth away from the non-Malthusian poverty trap, depending on the initial conditions on technology and human capital. The associated income growth may ultimately push the average fertility above the replacement level. The possibility of the fertility recovery is confirmed by a numerical analysis.
The Model
The economy has a one-sector, overlapping-generations structure and operates over an infinite discrete time horizon, 0,1, 2, t = . It is small in size and open to global capital markets, where the interest rate is stationary at 0 r > .
Firms
In perfectly competitive environments, firms generate a final good by employing physical capital and human capital (i.e., labor in efficiency units). Let t K and t H , respectively, be the aggregate levels of these factor inputs in period t. Further, let 0 t A > be the level of labor-augmenting technology in period t. Their relation- 3 The rise in fertility is consistent with a forecast of the United Nations, which is made by a time series model based on national experience (United Nations [9] , p. 17). In "more developed" regions, including Europe, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, total fertility turns upward around the year 2000, approaching to replacement level (United Nations [6] , p. viii and p. 12). While Strulik et al. ([10] p. 432) demonstrate fertility recovery by controlling a weight parameter for children in utility, in the model developed below, the future trend in fertility depends on the initial conditions. 4 While this paper extends the growth theory developed by Galor and Weil [11] , it does not take their unified approach. The focus here is on the modern era in which advanced economies have already experienced a demographic transition. Thus, the poverty trap presented in this paper does not describe the Malthusian stagnation, which results from population expansion under resource constraints. 5 The scale effect on the growth rate of technology becomes negligible in the long run provided that the skill-augmenting effect is bounded above (cf. Footnote 13) . The dissipation of the scale effect is in line with Jones [12] , whose model is more empirically plausible in this aspect than previous R&D-based growth theories. 
Households
A new generation is born at the beginning of each period and lives for three periods. Generation t, born in period 1 δ > and 0 t e ≥ are the basic and education cost, respectively, in terms of efficiency units of labor. 6 Capital and interest are used for consumption in the post-retirement period, such that no bequests are left to the offspring. To summarize, the budget constraint is
The utility of an individual of generation t, t u , depends not only on consumption in elderhood but also on aggregate income of his/her children. Each of these children acquires 1 t h + efficiency units of labor in period 1 t + . Taking these into account, the utility function is formulated as
where
α ∈ measures the degree of parental altruism. The level of efficiency units of labor hinges on two factors: the levels of education and technology. Human capital is augmented by technology, which embodies knowledge and ideas, on the grounds that their availability improves the efficiency of education. This is referred to as the skill-augmenting effect. The formation of human capital is formulated as
where ( ) The function h exhibits diminishing marginal productivity with respect to education and is increasing in technology. The positive cross derivative indicates their complementarity in skill formation. The second-last property (i.e., the first Inada condition) precludes the existence of a corner solution at 0.
t e = This preclusion would be plausible considering the present paper's focus on advanced stages of economic development.
As price takers, parents maximize their own utility by allocating resources between consumption, the quantity of children, and education for them. Substituting Equations (2) and (4) into Equation (3), the maximization problem faced by a member of generation t becomes
n e h e n h e A n α δ α
subject to ( ) , 0 t t n e ≥ . The logarithmic form implies that 0 t n > . In terms of t n , the objective function is strictly concave and the first-order condition yields , t t t h n e α δ = + (6) implying that t h α is the resource allocated to child rearing. Childbirth is encouraged by a rise in parental skill (i.e., the income effect) and is discouraged by a rise in the education cost (i.e., the substitution effect).
Substitution of Equation (6) into Equation (5) 
Aggregate Human Capital and Technological Progress
The working population in period 1 t + is given by
. Thus, substituting Equation (8) into Equations (4) and (6) 
reflects only the direct effect of knowledge/ideas on human capital (i.e., the aforementioned skill-augmenting effect) because the effect of any marginal change in ( ) t e A on skill formation is neutralized by its opposing effect on fertility. 9 As mentioned in the introduction, the present model abstracts from microeconomic foundations that account for the innovation process. Suppose that the creation of new technology is a by-product of manufacturing final output and depends on the level of aggregate rather than average human capital, on the ground that more skilled labor would come up with more ideas. Specifically, 
The Dynamical System
This section explores the joint evolution of technology and aggregate human capital. As will be apparent, the initial condition on ( )
A H  nails down the future path of ( )
A H , and thus, those of the other endogenous variables. 8 Given the properties of ( ) , 0 A H  below the shaded area converges to one of the stationary-state equilibria in the trap. 12 Note that the fall into the trap is not due to the Malthusian mechanism: the saturation of population under the resource constraint. A large population size is rather growth-promoting in the developed stages considered herein. The fall is caused by scarce initial endowments, as they restrain the aforementioned dynamic interaction between technology and aggregate human capital. As long as ( )
is given above the shaded area, t A eventually exceeds Â and then the evolution of t H displays a U-shaped turnaround. 13 The future path is 11 As a result of calibration based on the G-7 data, Strulik et al. ([10] , pp. 421 and 429) impose a similar restriction to the second inequality in Equation (A1). Unlike in the present model, however, their restriction makes the transition to the prosperous path automatic regardless of the initial conditions. 12 A linear approximation reveals that ( ) analytically ambiguous when the economy launches on the shaded area.
Analyses

The Hurdle to Sustainable Growth
As shown above, Â is the critical value that triggers the accumulation of aggregate human capital. In this sense, Â is the hurdle to prosperous, sustainable growth. Since ( ) 1 A φ = by definition, it follows from Equation (9) that Â depends on two structural parameters: α and , δ which respectively identity the degree of intergenerational altruism and the fixed cost of child rearing.
Either a decrease in α or an increase in δ lowers the growth factor of aggregate human capital ( ) t A φ for a given t A . The resulting rise in Â makes it more difficult for the economy to enter on the explosive path.
In light of the first condition of Equation (13), a rise in Â expands the domain of ( )
, A H on which the economy falls into the non-Malthusian poverty trap in Figure 1 . Even if the economy is initially on the explosive path, its growth process may be averted by a permanent change in those parameters. For instance, the degree of parental altruism might be affected by the growth of nuclear families and a shift in social norms through international exchanges. The fixed cost of child rearing would be higher as a result of natural disasters and deterioration in the quality of public services.
Growth and Depopulation
This subsection investigates population dynamics underlying the growth process. In line with Equation (17) (10), we can see that at least either t h or t N needs to grow in the long run to sustain productivity growth at a positive rate.
In view of Equations (4) and (8), the dynamic behavior of
Thus, working population decreases as long as aggregate human capital decreases, or equivalently, as long as t A is below Â in Figure 1 . 15 On the other hand, it does not necessarily begin growing at the onset of the accumulation of aggregate human capital, which occurs when t A exceeds Â . These indicate that initial depopulation does not necessarily block the way to sustainable growth.
While Equation (16) indicates the possibility of initial depopulation on an explosive path, it is not apparent whether or not such a demographic trend continues. One certain fact from Equation (14) is that the onset of population expansion is inevitable if average human capital t h converges toward a certain level on the path. 16 This case is brought about by a bounded production function of human capital satisfying Equation (A1). In the long-run, depopulation is compatible with productivity growth only if average human capital keeps increasing.
The Dynamic Trend in Fertility
As mentioned earlier, it is generally not clear whether or not t n reaches the replacement level, and it is analytically difficult to characterize its dynamic behavior. The difficulty stems from two counteracting effects of technological change on fertility. In light of Equations (4), (6) , and (8) n . On the other hand, an increase in t A shifts resources from the quantity to the quality of children (i.e., the substitution effect). These forces would make the dynamic trend in fertility, analytically ambiguous.
A quantitative prediction of fertility is depicted in Figure 2 , where one time period equals 30 years. The observed recovery to replacement level occurs under the following conditions. First, the production function of human capital is specified as Note that the function exhibits the property in Equation (A2): strong complementarity between education and technology in skill formation. 17 Second, initial values of population and human capital are normalized to one, that is, 0 1 N = and 0 1. h = Third, the structural parameters and initial condition on technology are such that 14 Applying the implicit function theorem to Equation (7), ( ) Negative population growth with low technology appears to be inconsistent with the historical experience of most economies, whose population has been expanding (cf. Maddison [14] , p. 241). As mentioned in the introduction, however, the focus here is on the contemporary period in which advanced economies begin aging, and encompassing the demographic patterns over the past millennia is beyond the scope of the present research. For this reason, the initial technology level 0 A is considered to be above a certain level, even though 0 A may be smaller than Â . 16 Strulik et al. [10] preclude such a case by setting the productivity parameter for education investment so large that Footnote 11). This condition is crucial, but not sufficient, for the accumulation of aggregate human capital against depopulation in the long run.
17 Equation (18) yields ( ) Under these circumstances, the initial level of average fertility is 0 0.835 n = , which is consistent with the experience of more developed regions from 1990 to 1995 (United Nations [6] , p. 12). 19 Per worker output t t A h increases twofold in 30 years, implying an annual growth rate of about 2.34%.
Concluding Remarks
The growth theory developed above has demonstrated that in the presence of a scale effect of human capital, the initial conditions on technology, population, and human capital determine whether an economy undergoing depopulation enters a steady-growth path, along which population growth may ultimately turn positive. The possibility of falling into the poverty trap is explained by initial depopulation, which depresses the scale effect on productivity growth. In addition to the main result, a permanent decline in parental altruism or in the fixed cost of child rearing raises the hurdle to sustainable growth and may thereby divert the economy from the prosperous path.
Without taking a unified-approach, the present paper focuses on the developed economy whose initial fertility rate is below replacement level. As such, the unsolved questions are how the initial conditions are determined and why they are different among advanced countries. In order to answer them, it is necessary to extend the model and consider the process of fertility decline from a longer-term perspective. This theme is left for future research.
